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I am delighted to join you here in New Orleans today.  Unfortunately, Art Siegel, the 
Executive Director of the Independence Standards Board, was unable to make it here 
today, and asked me to take his place and provide you with an update on ISB activities.  
 
Before I begin, however, I need to remind you that my remarks today reflect solely my 
personal views, and not necessarily those of the Board, individual Board members, or 
other members of the Staff. 
 
The Board came into being because both the SEC and the accounting profession have 
long wanted a clear conceptual framework for independence rules applying to auditors of 
public companies. 
 
Why is a conceptual framework needed?  Since the federal securities laws were enacted 
in the 1930’s, the independence rules have evolved in a piecemeal fashion, with no clear 
underlying set of principles.  There are now more than 200 pages of published rules, 
interpretations and “no-action” letters of the SEC and its staff. These are in addition to 50 
pages of rules, interpretations and ethics rulings of the AICPA, with which all US 
auditors must comply. 
 
The absence of clearly articulated principles means that the rules are often hard to apply 
to new situations by analogy.  And in today’s dynamic world, there are many new kinds 
of situations. 
 
In addition, the present rules generally assume that “one size fits all” – but what is 
appropriate for a 10-person accounting firm in one small city is not necessarily 
appropriate for a firm of 20,000 people spread across the country.  Finally, the multitude 
of detailed independence rules would eventually make it difficult to harmonize U.S. 
independence requirements with those of other nations, and in a global economy with 
increasing amounts of cross-border investing, this is become a higher priority. 
 
However - and importantly - despite its shortcomings, the current system has worked.  
Investors are comfortable in relying on published financial statements in large part 
because they have confidence in the integrity and objectivity – and in the independence – 
of the auditor.  Therefore, before we discard what we have, we must have confidence in 
its replacement – we need a framework that better protects the public interest. 
 
The Board’s formal Operating Policies clearly define its objectives and mission.  The 
Board is “to establish independence standards applicable to audits of public entities in 
order to serve the public interest and to protect and promote investors’ confidence in the 
securities markets.”  A simple and straightforward charge, but a very complex 
assignment. 
 
The Board is comprised of eight members - four from the public and four from the 
accounting profession.  William Allen, the Chairman, was for twelve years the 
Chancellor of the Court of Chancery in Delaware - that is, the head of what is generally 
 3 
recognized as the most important business court in the country.  The other public 
members are: 
 
John Bogle, the founder and now senior chairman of Vanguard, the second largest mutual 
fund group in the country; 
 
Robert Denham, now a partner in a law firm in Los Angeles, and who for many years 
served as the chairman of Salomon Brothers; and 
 
Manuel Johnson, the head of a financial consulting firm, who earlier in his career was a 
vice chairman of the Fed. 
 
The members from the profession are CEOs Steven Butler of KPMG, Philip Laskawy of 
Ernst & Young, James Schiro of PricewaterhouseCoopers and Barry Melancon of the 
AICPA. 
 
As you can see, it is an important and impressive group, and they take their charge very 
seriously. 
 
The Chief Accountant of the SEC also attends our Board meetings and has observer 
status, meaning he sits at the table and actively participates – which is very helpful. 
 
The Board is an independent body.  While the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section funds it, 
the Board sets its own budget and operates autonomously. 
 
In that respect, and in the openness of its processes, it is very similar to the FASB.  The 
ISB, for example, also is required to issue exposure drafts of any planned 
pronouncements, and will issue invitations to comment and hold public hearings when 
warranted. 
 
In addition, the Board’s deliberative processes are conducted “in the sunshine,” and you 
are welcome to attend its meetings or to listen by telephone.  The next meeting, by the 
way, is April 8 in New York. 
 
 
The ISB Staff 
 
The ISB professional staff currently consists of Art Siegel, as Executive Director, myself 
and another Director, along with an administrative assistant.  Art previously served as 
Vice-Chairman – Auditing at Price Waterhouse.  We are actively trying to increase our 
staff right now, as our workload has increased significantly. 
 
The staff’s role generally is two-fold.  First, we support the Board in the development of 
standards and in all of its other missions.  And second, we receive and respond to 




The staff maintains a public file of all appropriate documents, including minutes of 





The Independence Issues Committee is comprised of eight members from the profession.  
They were selected because they were the senior people in their firms responsible for 
independence matters, and therefore were most likely to be aware of current 
independence issues. Their names and affiliations are also shown on our website.  The 
IIC’s principal role is to deal with emerging independence issues in the same way 
FASB’s Emerging Issues Task Force does on emerging accounting issues.  That is, see if 
a consensus can be reached and published for the guidance of auditors and others.  They 
are also charged with assisting the Board in understanding issues the Board is addressing. 
 
Art Siegel serves as the Committee’s non-voting Chairman, and, just as at EITF, the SEC 
chief accountant or his designee serves as an observer.  The Committee also operates in 
public, and its next meeting is February 2, in New York. 
 
Although the IIC will use issue summaries and publish minutes and consensuses, just as 
the EITF does, there is a key difference.  Unlike the EITF, an IIC consensus will not 
become “substantial authoritative support” in the eyes of SEC staff, unless and until it is 
ratified by the ISB. 
 
ACTIVITY TO DATE 
 
Now let me talk briefly about what the Board itself has been doing and intends to do. 
 
Discussions with Audit Committees 
 
At the Board’s meeting on January 8th, it approved its first pronouncement on 
independence discussions with audit committees, which will require firms auditing public 
companies to: 
 
• describe each year, in a written report, all relationships with an audit client that could 
impact independence; 
 
• confirm in that written report that the firm is independent; and 
 
• discuss the contents of the report with the client’s audit committee. 
 
The Board’s intent in enacting this rule was to deepen the understanding by audit 
committees of independence issues, in recognition of the fact that companies have an 
obligation to engage independent accountants, and should not rely exclusively on 
representations from the auditor.  While audit committees are not expected to have 
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detailed knowledge of the independence rules, they can bring business judgment to this 
question just as they do to other issues coming before them as directors. 
 
On the Road to a Conceptual Framework 
 
The most important project on the Board’s agenda is the development of the conceptual 
framework.  The Board has engaged Professor Henry Jaenicke of Drexel University as 
project director, and Professor Alan Glazer of Franklin & Marshall is assisting him.  In 
addition, we have formed a broad-based project task force.  This advisory task force held 
its first meeting on October 29th, and a second meeting is scheduled for February 5.  The 
task force has a representative from the Bar Association – Tom Baker – as well as 
representatives from the user and academic communities, the practicing profession, 
international independence standard setters, 
along with corporate directors and executives. 
 
The Board’s objective is first to develop a neutral discussion memorandum which will be 
exposed for public comment.  With that input, the Board will then deliberate on the 
contents of a conceptual framework with the goal of issuing an exposure draft, again for 
public comment.  At each stage of this process the Board will consider whether public 
hearings also should be held.  After obtaining that input, the Board would then again 
deliberate and conclude on the contents of the conceptual framework for independence. 
 
Let me share with you some early thinking on the possible contents of a conceptual 
framework: 
 
• The investor’s need for reliable and credible financial statements; 
• The objectives of audits and of auditor independence; 
• The relationship of independence to objectivity and integrity.  This would include a 
definition of independence; and 
• If there is a “reasonable investor” test, how that theoretical person might be defined. 
Also, the Conceptual Framework should address the factors to consider in setting 
independence standards.  For example: 
• Should costs and benefits be considered, if they can be measured? 
• Can threats to independence be mitigated by firm-specific safeguards, or 
compensating controls, and if so, when? 
• When should the appearance of impaired independence be a factor, and how 
should that be determined? 
• Is materiality a consideration in reaching – or applying – independence standards, 
and if so, how should it be measured? 
• What does “mutuality of interests” mean and when might it properly be 
considered a threat to independence? 
Additional Issues to Consider  
Additional issues that may need to be considered are: 
 
• What is the role of firm codes of conduct and cultures? 
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• What role, if any, in maintaining independence is properly assigned to corporate 
officers and directors, including the audit committee?  
• And finally, what role should be played by the profession’s overseers.  This would 
include the SEC, the Public Oversight Board, the state boards of accountancy, and the 
AICPA. 
 
As you can see, the conceptual framework is the most basic and important issue facing 
the Board.  It also is complex and multi-faceted, and we should not expect any final 
conclusions for probably two years or so.  When it is completed, it will not, of itself, 
“answer” independence questions, but it should define the parameters within which one 
would logically find conceptually consistent answers. 
 
Employment with Audit Clients 
 
The Board has chosen to proceed with two other projects concurrently with the 
development of the conceptual framework.  Let’s first review the issues related to the 
project on Partners and Staff joining audit clients.  
 
The concerns expressed when professionals leave firms to join audit clients generally are 
threefold: 
 
• First, that members of the audit team, who may have been friendly with, or respectful 
of a former partner or professional when he or she was with the firm, would be 
reluctant to challenge the decisions of the former partner or professional.  As a result, 
they might accept a client’s proposed accounting without exercising appropriate 
objectivity and skepticism. 
• Second, in situations where partners or other audit team members resign to accept 
positions with audit clients, questions may be raised regarding whether the 
individuals exercised an appropriate level of skepticism during the audit process prior 
to their departure. 
• And finally, that the departing partner or professional may be familiar enough with 
the firm’s audit approach and testing strategy so as to be able to circumvent its 
design. 
 
Generally, proposed solutions to this contentious issue center either around the: 
• Establishment of safeguards or mitigating controls by the audit firm, or 
• Establishment of a mandated cooling-off period – specifying some period of time 
during which the audit firm’s independence would be impaired if a professional were 
hired in an “audit sensitive” role – thus forcing the client to engage a new auditor. 
 
There is not a lot of empirical data in this area, in part because it is so difficult to attribute 
causation to the existence of an “alumnus” of the audit firm at the client when there are 
allegations of financial fraud.  But it is a high profile issue because it is so easy for the 
press to identify the alumni on the company’s payroll, and there is the inevitable analogy 
to the “revolving door” which has such a bad name in Washington.  Of course, in the vast 
majority of cases, this is a one-way door.  People rarely go back to their audit firm.  But 
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the issue has gotten more attention lately because we have seen more senior people, 
including partners, leaving their firms to go to work at clients.   
So it is an issue that cries out for resolution. 
 
The Board also created a broad-based project task force on this topic, which met in 
October and helped to prepare a discussion memorandum examining all viewpoints on 
the issues.  The Board approved the issuance of the DM for public comment (it will be 




Let me briefly discuss the family relationships issue. 
 
• Currently, there are family relationships between audit firm professionals and client 
personnel that are deemed to impair the auditor’s independence. 
 
But there are new stresses on the operation of the existing rules.  For example: 
 
• The notion of close family has evolved. 
• Many audit firms and clients have become large, multinational organizations, while 
some of the rules were written when firms were small and collegial, and company 
operations were more centralized.  Does it make sense to say that a consulting 
partner’s spouse who works on the West coast cannot participate in an employee 
stock plan because the firm audits the company out of its New York office? 
• In this age of instant communications, do the previously applied “geographic 
separation” rules continue to be appropriate? 
• Finally, the success of women in business has increased the number of employment-
related family relationship questions. 
 
Questions to be answered include: 
 
• Should considerations be different for those participating on an engagement vs. firm 
personnel not on an engagement?  For that matter, who is considered to be “on an 
engagement?” 
• What are “close family” relationships?  Should the rules be rigid or flexible, and 
where should the lines be drawn? 
• Do different rules for partners, managers and all other employees make sense? 
• Is geographic distance a mitigating control today, or is using the chain of command 
better? 
• Are there materiality considerations that need to be considered? 
• Can “firewalls” within the auditing firm be effective? 
• What is best practice?  What rules are in existence in other countries, or in other 
professions or government agencies? 
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At the direction of the Board, the Staff is preparing an Invitation to Comment on several 
of the issues, as well as a new, alternative approach to determining when and where 




Let’s switch now to the Independence Issues Committee.  The IIC has two issues under 
consideration beyond activities supporting the Board projects just described.  
• The first of these is on “alternative practice structures.”  As you may have seen in the 
press, American Express and several other corporations have become “consolidators” 
of the non-attest operations of small to middle-sized accounting firms.  Often the 
attest services remain in a separate firm owned by the CPAs, but the attest firms lease 
staff, facilities, etc. from the corporate entity. The IIC is attempting to develop a 
consensus on the restrictions that should apply in these situations to auditors of public 
companies.  The issue summary on this matter is available on our website, and we 
hope that the Committee reaches a consensus at its February 2nd meeting. 
• Another matter being studied by the IIC relates to the level and nature of assistance 
an auditor can provide an audit client in implementing FAS 133, “Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.”  Again, we are hopeful that a 




In conclusion, we at the ISB know we have a major challenge ahead of us.  However, this 
also is a unique opportunity.  
 
I believe I can speak for the Board in encouraging all who have an interest in the subject 
of auditor independence to fully participate in our processes.  Only in that way can we be 
confident that we are best serving the public interest.  And it is clear to me that an 
emphasis on the public good has been, and continues to be, in the best long-term interests 
of the profession. 
 
Thank you very much for your attention. 
 
